Concrete Achievements

Tag: europe

  • Links from the week of 30 November 2020

    Articles, reports and other links I shared on Twitter this week.

  • All Europeans now know that DeKalb County exists, AND that it’s pronounced de-cab, so why…

    All Europeans now know that DeKalb County exists, AND that it’s pronounced de-cab, so why don’t they know as much about European politics as they do about American? Because we have a better electoral system.

    Of course, the US is big, and important, and the elections are huge news events – BUT part of the problem with American elections is that first past the post (winner takes all) elections create lots of narrow finishes and high drama – at the cost of millions of wasted votes.

    The reason that we know about @ItsInDeKalb is that the US electoral system makes swing counties in swing states hugely important. I guarantee that you will never hear @TehamaCountyED get the same focus – because it’s in California.

    But in the same way you will never hear about Łomża county (pronounced WOM-zha) holding the balance of power in the European Parliament – because it never will. Proportional representation means that a few votes in Łomża don’t turn the scale more than a few votes in Warsaw.

    That’s bad for the tourism service of @umlomza, but good for European governance, and for European voters. Quick, proportional elections mean votes count more equally. They make for good politics, but bad political theatre (and no days of sitting in front of Euronews).

  • This is a good read by ⁦@duncanrobinson⁩ – but the missing element is money.

    This is a good read by ⁦@duncanrobinson⁩ – but the missing element is money. Charles I and Louis XVI were both brought down because the had to get their Parliaments’ consent to taxes. economist.com/europe/2020/10…

    National governments have the whip hand for several reasons but one big one is that in the end they have to raise the money to write the cheques for parliament. This is why own resources and competences are so important.

    If the EU is to become more democratic that doesn’t just mean more popular participation (in elections and in between) and a stronger « European public sphere » – it also means power for the institutions to do things and raise the money for them.

  • Fascinating indeed. What strikes me is that this U.K.

    Fascinating indeed. What strikes me is that this U.K. government’s brand is Brexit – and when the Brexit disaster reveals itself, quickly in January and/or slowly over coming years, they have no credibility left. twitter.com/anandMenon1/st…

    That makes any attempt to blame-shift onto spiteful Europeans, treacherous remoaners, Covid etc, instantly less credible. “Oh yeah remember how they messed up Covid/FSM/etc, it’s the same with Brexit.”

    That eighty seat majority (which will be defended in the fourteenth year of Tory-led government) is not much to shout about.

  • Links from the week of 14 September 2020

    Articles, reports and other links I shared on Twitter this week.

  • So the party that drove the creation of Europe’s single market is now a Fidesz clone…

    So the party that drove the creation of Europe’s single market is now a Fidesz clone, smashing up laws, delegitimising opposition and feeding off hardline nationalism. twitter.com/Conservatives/…

    If you’re watching this from Brussels (well, from one of the bits of Brussels where you have the power to do things about it, unlike my living room) how can you look at this and see a potential partner, now or in the future?

    And if you’re looking at it from Dublin or Belfast, how can you think other than this U.K. government wants a hard border on your island, no matter what the cost?

  • Interesting – though you have the connected-vessels problem that the more potential power…

    Interesting – though you have the connected-vessels problem that the more potential power it has, the more its field of action will be constrained. t.co/sdNo7W7Wxr

    I agree that treaty changes are needed, but they probably need to emerge from a broad process in the Conference (particularly the citizen parts where I suspect citizens will want a more streamlined Europe than nation state governments do).

    I think if we get stuck on treaty changes as the goal, rather than the treaty as a mechanism to bring about particular policy and governance goals for Europe, we end up with something that inspires 600 people in Brussels and no-one else.

  • Links from the week of 24 August 2020

    Articles, reports and other links I shared on Twitter this week.

  • This would be true in a world where Brexit weren’t a coalition between xenophobic…

    This would be true in a world where Brexit weren’t a coalition between xenophobic nationalists and 51st-stater free marketeers. The UK will veer between US (51st stater), autarky (nationalists) and EU (anti-Brexiteers) for a decade or so. twitter.com/b_judah/status…

    The realities of geography probably means it ends up closer to the EU, if not fully in the more integrated Union that @gideonrachman discusses. However, the 51st-staters will spend next few years trying to entrench things like US regulatory standards to hinder that.

    Though even if there were an outbreak of grown-up politics, the UK wouldn’t be at the *centre* of a revived western alliance, it would be the third wheel of the bike, or in Boris Johnson terms, the Marcus Aemilius Lepidus of a western triumvirate.

  • Today’s #euco discussions on the #eubudget and #NextGenerationEU fund show that Europe…

    Today’s #euco discussions on the #eubudget and #NextGenerationEU fund show that Europe needs a Madisonian moment to go with its (not-quite) Hamiltonian one.

    Case number 1: @MinPres Mark Rutte saying that the Dutch government wants guarantees about the effectiveness of reforms in “southern” countries.

    Case number 2: Victor Orban’s parliament insisting that there should be no conditionality on rule of law, and that the Article 7 procedure against Hungary should be dropped in return for a budget deal.

    There are obviously lots of competing demands in the #eubudget process – but these are the two that clarify the problem. In both cases a member state is trying to push its own view of the world on others, with the budget process as a tool.

    Why does this matter? Because the #NextGenerationEU COVID recovery fund means the EU will be borrowing as a Union, and the proposals on how the money gets paid back may mean more EU-level taxes. That’s what’s been called the “Hamiltonian moment” for EU finances.

    (It isn’t quite, because Hamilton took on the existing debts of the states, this is just creating new common debt, but you can see how one might gradually lead to another).

    However, Rutte and Orban show that common financing won’t work if the politics of EU finance stay stuck in “what I pay and what I get” mode. Rutte is quite right that the Dutch public deserve democratic oversight of the money they are spending

    but quite wrong that this oversight should pass through him. It should go through the Parliament and the executive at EU level – particularly if they are also raising the money to pay for it.

    This isn’t just a EU issue, it’s about accountability and efficiency. If the EU institutions have power to raise funds, but national governments get the blame, it’s an invitation to wasteful spending on boondoggles and pet projects.

    Similarly, if Orban or other autocratic governments can hold budgetary processes hostage for their antidemocratic crusades, illiberal cronyism will run rampant.

    “Treaty Change” is the longest four letter word in Brussels, but it’s time for a serious conversation about how democracy and accountability need to go alongside new debt raising and tax raising powers. (end)